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Can conceptual engineering actually promote social justice?1 
 
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky 




This paper explores the question: What would conceptual engineering have to be in order to promote 
social justice? Specifically, it argues that to promote social justice, conceptual engineering must deliver 
the following: (i) it needs to be possible to deliberately implement a conceptual engineering proposal in 
large communities; (ii) it needs to be possible for a conceptual engineering proposal to bring about 
change to extant social categories; (iii) it needs to be possible to bring a population to adopt a 
conceptual engineering proposal for the right reasons; and (iv) it needs to be possible to do (i) – (iii) 
without producing harmful consequences. I show that, of the three dominant approaches to conceptual 
engineering in the literature, only one of them seems amenable to the idea that it is possible and 





Conceptual engineering is a heavily contested notion. In particular, there is widespread difference in what 
theorists argue, or at least assume, should be the relevant subject matter of conceptual engineering; or what 
aspects of the general representational terrain should be revised (i.e. concepts, meanings, linguistic practices, 
etc.)2 In recent times, many projects in conceptual engineering have aimed to advance pursuits in the project of 
social justice. I have in mind strategies such as Sally Haslanger's (2000) ameliorative definitions of 'race' and 
'gender,' Katharine Jenkins's (2016) trans* inclusive account of 'woman,' Kate Manne's (2018) revisionary 
analysis of 'misogyny,' and Robin Dembroff's (2016) reappraisal of 'sexual orientation.' Other examples 
abound.3 While each account offers a way to make our existing representational terrain better, certain 
questions can be asked. Looking backward, we might wonder: How plausible are such suggestions? And, 
looking forward we might think: Should engineers continue to submit proposals?  
 
With this in mind, this paper explores the question: What would conceptual engineering have to be in order to 
promote social justice? Specifically, I will assess the relative merits of competing approaches to conceptual 
engineering with respect to how amenable they are to advancing our social justice goals.  
 
Now, this does not mean that whatever approach comes out best is true. My goal is only to discern which 
approach to conceptual engineering makes sense of justice-oriented ameliorative projects. After all, without a 
                                                
1 I owe a lot of thanks to several people for their help and guidance in developing this paper: Karen Jones, Laura 
Schroeter, the philosophy postgraduate cohort at the University of Melbourne, and the attendees of my talks at the 
Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference and the Words Workshop. In particular, I am greatly indebted to 
wonderful reviewers at Synthese. Each of them took time to carefully work with me in shaping and framing this project. I am 
incredibly grateful for their insights and expertise.   
2 Löhr (2021) has recently argued that we needn’t think of conceptual engineering within a representationalist 
framework. Like most, I will assume representationalism in this paper.  
3 For instance, Barnes (2016, 2020) and Jenkins (2018).  
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plausible story of how to implement improvements to aspects of our representational terrain, it is unclear how 
useful ameliorative projects are in the fight against injustice. However, if there is independent reason to reject 
the truth of the theory that comes out best, or there are clear reasons that outweigh moral, social, or political 
aims, then it might turn out that no approach to conceptual engineering is suited to social justice purposes, 
even if one is ‘best.’ Given this, my aim is not to argue that one approach stands out as best all-things-
considered. This paper is a project, relative to the available facts, that examines which account of conceptual 
engineering, if it were true, is most able to promote social justice.4  
In what's to come, I will argue that to deliver on the promise of promoting social justice, conceptual 
engineering must account for the following: (i) it needs to be possible to deliberately implement a conceptual 
engineering proposal in large communities; (ii) it needs to be possible for a conceptual engineering proposal to 
bring about change to extant social categories; (iii) it needs to be possible to bring a population to adopt a 
conceptual engineering proposal for the right reasons; and (iv) it needs to be possible to do (i) – (iii) without 
producing harmful consequences. 
 
I show that, of the three dominant approaches to conceptual engineering in the literature, only one of them 
seems amenable to the idea that it is possible and legitimate to promote social justice through conceptual 
engineering. What are these approaches? Each differs in what it takes to be the relevant subject matter of 
conceptual engineering. Quickly, one approach, endorsed by Herman Cappelen (2018), takes conceptual 
engineering to be a matter of changing not simply our linguistic practices, but object-level facts. In contrast to 
Cappelen, Sarah Sawyer (2020, 2021) argues that conceptual engineering is about aligning the extension of a 
term with the relevant subject matter fixed by a concept, where the change in question does not concern object-
level facts, but rather a community’s understanding of particular aspects of the world. Finally, theorists such as 
Sally Haslanger (2020), Amie Thomasson (2020), and Jennifer Nado (2019), advocate for a view of conceptual 
engineering that focuses on changing representational practices in line with certain functions of such practices. 
I will argue that this latter approach to conceptual engineering, what I will call The Functional Account, gets 
closest to what conceptual engineering would have to be in order to promote social justice according to (i) – 
(iv).5  
 
1. What Would Conceptual Engineering Have to Be? 
 
There are certain things that we might expect from conceptual engineering to advance our moral, social, and 
political causes. It's not unreasonable to assume that if conceptual engineering is to be put in the service of 
justice, then it must be useful to us as a tool for disruption and change. But what would make conceptual 
engineering a useful tool in the fight against injustice? Put differently: What does conceptual engineering need 
to be in order to contribute to achieving more just social relations?  
 
In recent literature, some theorists of conceptual engineering have, more or less explicitly, been interested in 
questions of feasibility (e.g., Podosky 2018, Fischer 2020, Andow 2021). 6  Like moral and political 
philosophy, the questions center on whether normative theorizing about a representational practice should be 
constrained by reasonable expectation. If conceptual engineering is impossible, then it is not unreasonable for 
                                                
4 The reader will notice an absence of internalist theories of conceptual engineering. By ‘internalist’, I don’t mean to 
limit myself to theories of meaning, but instead conceptual engineering approaches that discuss higher-order cognition 
more broadly. It is only recently that such theories have been introduced into the fold (Pollock 2020, Fischer 2020, Isaac 
2020, and to some extent Podosky 2018). The reason for this omission is only due to limiting my discussion to approaches 
of conceptual engineering that have been more prominently examined. It may turn out that internalist theories are better 
suited to social justice theorizing. However, I have reservations about this given that much injustice is material. 
5 I want to be clear that this paper does not assume that change to the representational terrain is necessary or sufficient 
for real-world change for justice. It assumes something weaker: conceptual engineering can promote social justice.  
6 Podosky (2018) is concerned with the means by which looping effects can be controlled; Fischer (2020) focuses on 
feasibility with respect to our ability to reason with engineers' concepts; Andow (2021) argues that we should assess the 
likelihood of success against the potential value of success.    
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one to judge that it is pointless; ‘the success rate of conceptual engineering may be low enough to make 
conceptual engineering not worth bothering with' (Andow 2021, p. 218).  
 
One might see this paper as a project that attempts to assess the feasibility of competing conceptual engineering 
frameworks. However, it is perhaps not possible, or at the very least it is perhaps too hard, to articulate a set of 
desiderata to assess the feasibility of a conceptual engineering framework in a way that is independent of the 
project of giving a framework of conceptual engineering. This is to say that there may be no way to assess the 
feasibility of a conceptual engineering framework without at the same time assuming a (partial) theory of 
conceptual engineering. Thus, I sidestep questions or concerns about feasibility by distancing myself from 
projects of this kind.  
 
Rather than assess the relative merits of competing frameworks of conceptual engineering against standards of 
feasibility, I will instead simply discuss what we might expect conceptual engineering to do for us – or what 
conceptual engineering needs to be in order to promote social justice. Whether or not such expectations are 
feasible goes beyond the scope of this paper. This is an additional concern. I will simply offer a list of 
requirements on conceptual engineering that must be met if it is to be useful to us in the fight against injustice.  
 
What's on this list?  
 
1.1. Control  
 
(i) It must be possible to deliberately implement a conceptual engineering proposal in large communities. 
 
Part of the challenge of conceptual engineering concerns our ability to successfully implement an ameliorative 
strategy; to see a proposal executed out in the wild. I needn’t commit myself to any set of success conditions. 
Whatever these conditions are, there must be some sensitivity to our ability to control the character and 
direction of the representational terrain towards a proposed improvement. That is, there must some means by 
which proposed change, developed by an engineer, can be intentionally propagated within a community of 
thinkers and speakers. Thus, the problem of ‘control’ refers to the extent to which the propagation of a 
conceptual engineering proposal is possible. This formulation is neutral regarding which facts we must have 
control over (e.g., intension, extension, reference, definition, etc.).7 
 
One might think that control isn’t necessary. In the absence of control, we should just aim to be disruptive in 
the hope that we will do some good overall. However, there are a few reasons to think this might not be right.8  
 
First, it seems that control is important for the purposes of delineating the theoretical boundaries of justice-
oriented conceptual engineering. If control is impossible, and we should simply throw everything we can into 
disruption, then all conceptual engineering proposals that purport to promote social justice seem to be 
theoretically on a par, or unable to be compared from a social justice point of view. This appears to render 
justice-oriented conceptual engineering a rather uninteresting theoretical endeavor. However, my project 
considers the question of what conceptual engineering would have to look like for it to be an interesting 
theoretical endeavor.  
 
                                                
7  Matthieu Queloz and Friedemann Bieber (forthcoming) have recently argued that lack of control in the 
implementation of engineered concepts might actually be a good thing given our prior commitments to liberal democratic 
ideals. If control over conceptual uptake were institutionalized, then this power might (i) end up in the wrong hands and (ii) 
limit freedom of thought which undermines consent. This is a genuine concern, but I don’t have time to explore it in this 
paper.  
8 This is in addition to the point disruption in and of itself may not promote social justice in any case.   
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To fill this out a bit more, the problem is that theories need only purport to promote social justice because, in 
the absence of control, we cannot know or reasonably assume that a proposal will in fact promote social justice. 
This seems to entail that the justification for making a conceptual engineering proposal can be rather thin or 
minimal. To reiterate, this appears to make justice-oriented conceptual engineering an uninteresting form of 
philosophical theorizing.   
 
A second problem, related to the first, is that in the absence of control, we lose a means of comparing 
conceptual engineering projects. Why? One reason why we might prefer a particular conceptual engineering 
proposal is that, ceteris paribus, it is more plausibly implemented – which can only be judged assuming control. 
Another reason is that without control, conceptual engineers will just be shooting in the dark, as it were. So, 
comparing the relative merits of competing theories, according to which social justice goals they will in fact, or 
likely, advance, is epistemically impossible. We can only compare such theories according to which goals they 
purport to advance, which again, is not very interesting since, in the absence of knowing or reasonably 
assuming whether a proposal will actually promote social justice, anything goes (or at least most things).9  
 
1.2. Looping Effects  
 
(ii) It must be possible for a conceptual engineering proposal to bring about change to extant social categories. 
 
My interest is in the resolution of unjust social relations. Sometimes injustice can only be resolved through the 
amendment, and even creation, of social categories (Dembroff 2020). For example, if the social category 
woman is unjust insofar as it excludes trans* women, then justice requires amending this category to be more 
inclusive. Part of what is required to achieve this is the introduction of new linguistic practices, such as 
classification and application dispositions, which construct, or reconstruct, categories through looping effects 
(Hacking 1999, Mallon 2016). This is the mutual causal feedback between our linguistic practices (i.e. 
classification) and social kinds. As Robin Dembroff puts it, 'by developing classification practices, we create 
social kinds, which in turn impact classification practices, and so on' (2020, p. 7). Thus, where 'control' 
concerns the propagation of a conceptual engineering proposal, this requirement concerns the possibility of 
successful looping effects, brought about with an ameliorative strategy, that create or amend social categories 
(Podosky 2018, p. 13). 
 
1.3. Right Kind of Reasons  
 
(iii) It must be possible to bring a population to adopt a conceptual engineering proposal for the right reasons. 
 
Conceptual engineering projects are often motivated by particular reasons. Yet, it is entirely possible that a 
conceptual engineering proposal, were it to be taken up, is adopted by members of a thinking and speaking 
community for reasons other than those that motivated the engineer. After all, a proposal might be propagated 
by preference for conformity, or a desire to guarantee efficient communication, or social pressure, etc. 
However, some conceptual engineering projects, for the purposes of social justice, might require that members 
of a community adopt a proposal for the right kind of reasons. For example, Joey Pollock (2020) argues that 
with respect to the amelioration of ‘marriage,’ conceptual engineers have moral motivations – such as 
‘contributing to the dismantling of oppressive social structures, institutions and systems of belief, and replacing 
them with those that will promote and sustain social equality’ (2020, p. 88). Given this, such reasons must be 
‘transmitted’ from the engineer to the individuals intended to take up the revised practice. This is required to 
‘overwrite specific existing problematic beliefs and dispositions [involving ‘marriage’] with those that will 
contribute to promoting and sustaining social equality for the relevant group’ (2020, p. 90). Put differently, for 
some projects in conceptual engineering, the reasons that motivate changing a practice are constitutive of the 
                                                
9 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
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ameliorative project itself. Thus, this requirement states that, for at least some conceptual engineering projects, 
it must be possible for a population to adopt a proposal for the right kind of reasons – or the reasons that 
motivated the engineer.10  
 
1.4. Harmful Consequences and Unfitting Application Dispositions 
 
(iv) It must be possible to do (i) – (iii) without producing harmful consequences. 
 
Sometimes intended revisions to our representational terrain are morally or politically illegitimate. Rather than 
promoting social justice, such revisions instead contribute to creating or sustaining structural inequalities, or 
producing deleterious effects for certain members of a population. Concerns of this kind have been referred to 
as linguistic, conceptual, or meaning ‘degeneration’ in contrast to ‘amelioration’ (Cappelen 2018, p. 59).  
Broadly speaking, the worry of illegitimate revisions is that they can produce harmful consequences for 
particular social groups.11 Here’s an example. Through repeated association, ‘urban youth’, in the American 
context, is used in a way that invokes and entrenches pernicious stereotypes or generic characterizations of 
young Black men as dangerous (Stanley 2016, Ch. 4), leading to reprehensible social practices such as police 
brutality and even institution-backed murder.  
 
Given the possibility of illegitimate revisions to our representational practices, a requirement is that successful 
conceptual engineering must not carry with it a high degree of risk of having harmful consequences. This 
concern is closely related to control. If we don’t have control over a representational practice, then of course a 
conceptual engineering proposal is at risk of becoming illegitimate – say, through being hijacked or 
appropriated by dominant oppressive powers. However, it is important to assess the risk of harmful 
consequences within a community even when control is possible, albeit difficult.  
 
1.5. The Problem of Perversion 
 
Teresa Marques (2020) has brought to light a distinctive and problematic phenomenon that faces conceptual 
engineering. Rather than amelioration, our word meanings can be perverted. Marques’ notion of meaning 
perversion has a precise and technical application. It occurs when a word that is typically used to refer to a 
particular kind K1, and the use of which recruits certain norms, values, or rights in a context, becomes used to 
refer to another kind K2, often through varied forms of implicit or overt manipulation.  
 
The significance of this kind of problem must be stressed. Meaning perversions explain how unjust social 
relations are, at least partly, created and maintained. Marques refers to moments in history to show this. For 
example, Nazi propaganda changed what was expressed by ‘fanatical’ to heroic, the consequence of which 
increased the number of fanatic soldiers and strengthened the Nazi army (2020, p. 263). The lesson that 
Marques offers is that ‘the self-declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning 
perversions’ (2020, p. 260).  
 
It’s important to reiterate the Marques’ notion of meaning perversion is particular. It involves the 
misapplication of a word to an unsuitable referent (2020, p. 276). Given this, meaning perversions are 
indifferent to whether conceptual engineering is successful. It is entirely possible that meaning perversions can 
occur and transgress the limits of permissible change to the general representational terrain (i.e. topic 
                                                
10 Unfortunately, how exactly to determine when a conceptual engineering project must be adopted for the right kind of 
reasons won't be discussed in this paper. All that I am committed to is that, for the purposes of social justice, an approach to 
conceptual engineering must be able to accommodate this possibility.  
11 By harm, I don’t just mean physical. Instead, I take a broadly Feinbergean view of harm that involves a setback to 
interests that are reasonable and legitimate – which includes psychological injury (Feinberg 1987).  
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continuity). 12 In contrast, the notion of degeneration, as I will understand it, occurs when conceptual 
engineering is successful, but nevertheless produces harmful consequences.   
 
Given its insensitivity to the success of conceptual engineering, meaning perversions are an equal risk for any 
ameliorative project, no matter which approach one is working with. As such, I won’t explain how each of the 
approaches in the upcoming discussion risk meaning perversion. Perhaps the risk of meaning perversion is 
insurmountable, and as such it undermines any chance of conceptual engineering being suitably justice-
promoting. If this is the case, then so be it. I will nevertheless explore which theory comes closest to what 
conceptual engineering needs to be in order to promote social justice. In particular, I will only discuss the 
requirements on conceptual engineering that operate within the bounds of what is permissible according to 
each theory, such as topic continuity.13  
 
1.6.  Why (i) – (iv)? 
 
Why these conditions? To my knowledge, such are the concerns that have been raised by those interested in 
justice-oriented conceptual engineering. However, there is more to be said. Each condition represents a 
potential barrier to change. If we cannot control the adoption of conceptual engineering proposal, then there is 
not much point in trying for the purposes of social justice; if we cannot amend or create social categories 
through looping effects with a conceptual engineering proposal, then there is not much point in developing 
proposals to effect looping effects for the purposes of social justice; if we cannot at least sometimes get a 
population to adopt a conceptual engineering proposal for the right kind of reasons, then there is not much 
point in trying for the purposes of social justice; and if we cannot develop a conceptual engineering proposal 
without some guarantee that it won’t produce harm, then there is not much point in trying for the purposes of 
social justice. 
 
A couple of things to note. First, this list is not exhaustive. It only captures some of the things we might expect 
from justice-oriented conceptual engineering. Nevertheless, I believe it accounts for the major concerns that 
have been discussed in recent conceptual engineering literature, and gets to the heart of many of the worries 
regarding the usefulness of conceptual engineering for promoting social justice. Second, merely satisfying only 
one of (i) – (iv) is often not, perhaps never, enough for conceptual engineering to promote social justice. For 
instance, having greater control in the implementation process of conceptual engineering, and its looping 
effects, does not entail that the ameliorative project won’t produce harmful consequences. In saying this, having 
greater control and being motivated by good intentions perhaps renders the risk of harm sufficiently low 
enough to make an ameliorative project legitimate.  
 
With all of this on the table, the next question is: which approach to conceptual engineering gets closest to 




Now that I have the basic idea of what conceptual engineering needs to be in order to promote social justice, I 
want to introduce three competing approaches to conceptual engineering that, to my understanding, are the 
most prominent in the literature: The Worldly Account, The Alignment Account, and The Functional Account. 
After this, I will assess the relevant merits of each theory against (i) – (iv) above.  
 
 
                                                
12 In fact, it is plausible to interpret Marques as saying that meaning perversion always involves topic disruption. 
Although, this might depend on what one means by ‘topic.’ 
13 It should be noted that some theorists deflate the problem of topic continuity. See Simion and Kelp (2020) 
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2.1. The Worldly Account  
 
Perhaps the most prominent account of what would constitute a successful conceptual engineering project is 
offered by Herman Cappelen (2018). He argues that the limits of conceptual engineering should be 
understood within a moderate externalist metasemantic framework, in the tradition of Kripke, Putnam, Burge, 
and Williamson. According to externalist theories of this kind, a range of factors ‘outside of the head,’ such as 
past patterns of usage, communicative chains, and experts within a community, play a substantive role in fixing 
reference.  
 
Further, Cappelen’s understanding of conceptual engineering is strongly metaphysical. The success of 
conceptual engineering depends on actual changes to the world. That is, the goal of an ameliorative project is to 
change reference, its intension and extension (2018, p. 138).14 Put differently, conceptual engineering is not 
about changing thinking and speaking practices per se, but changing them with the effect of changing object-
level facts. For instance, an account that aims to ameliorate linguistic practices with ‘woman’ is ultimately an 
account that aims to change what, or who, women are. 
 
2.2. The Alignment Account  
 
In response to Cappelen, Sarah Sawyer (2020, 2021) has argued that the ‘worldly’ construal of conceptual 
engineering, one that focuses on changing object-level facts, isn’t the best option to take within an externalist 
framework. Part of the reason for this is that Cappelen cannot account for topic continuity. Conceptual 
engineering must not change the relevant subject matter of inquiry, for this would not solve the problems that 
were of initial theoretical interest (Strawson 1963).  
 
Some have understood the problem of topic continuity as a matter of whether conceptual engineering can 
preserve the extension of a term. If the extension of a term has changed, then the topic has changed – or so it 
goes. Sawyer disagrees with this. She does not think that the meaning of a term fixes the relevant subject matter. 
Instead, it is the reference of a concept, expressed by a term, that connects the term to a topic. Thus, what makes 
Sawyer’s account distinctive is a broadly Burgean distinction between the meaning of a term and the concept it 
expresses.  
 
For Sawyer, the meaning or intension of a (non-indexical) term is externally determined. That is, it is 
determined by social practices; stable patterns of usage and deference within a community.  Put differently, the 
meaning of a term is a characterization of the relevant subject matter that members of a thinking and speaking 
community would settle on were they to reach reflective equilibrium (2020, p. 383). And, because patterns of 
usage change throughout time, the intension of a term, and therefore its extension, can change too. The 
question, then, is how extensions can change without changing the topic?  
 
The answer: concepts, that are expressed by terms, fix the relevant subject matter. Like the meaning of terms, 
according to Sawyer, concepts are externally determined. However, concepts, in contrast to terms, are 
constituent elements of thought that representationally connect thinkers to a topic. And, the relationship 
between concept and the world is referentially direct: fundamental, non-conceptual/descriptive relations to 
objective properties. 
 
What’s important to note is the relationship between concepts and meanings. The concept expressed by a term 
fixes the relevant subject matter, and the meaning of a term is determined by a community’s characterization of 
                                                
14 Cappelen (2018) states that no success conditions for conceptual engineering can be given since the terms stated in 
such conditions are subject to revision.  
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this subject matter. Thus, the extension of a term can change and yet pose no problem for the continuity of a 
topic. What mustn’t change, in order to preserve topic continuity, is the extension of a concept.  
 
On Sawyer’s account, then, conceptual engineering is the project of alignment. Specifically, it is about 
changing a linguistic practice in a way that aligns the extension of a term with the relevant subject matter. In 
Sawyer’s words,  
 
If a revisionary analysis if correct and accepted, the effect is to bring the extension of the linguistic meaning 
of a term in line with the extension of the concept it expresses (i.e., in line with the relevant subject matter); 
it moves the linguistic practice closer to truth (2020, p. 391).  
 
From this, we can see that Sawyer’s take on conceptual engineering isn’t metaphysical. It isn’t about changing 
object-level facts. Instead, it is epistemic.15 It is about the accuracy of a community’s characterization or theory 
of a particular subject matter fixed by a concept. 
 
2.3. The Functional Account  
 
In contrast to both Cappelen and Sawyer, some have argued that conceptual engineering is ultimately about the 
relationship between function and representational practice. There are different ways of construing what this 
means.  
 
2.3.1. Functional Roles 
 
One way to think about function is to consider the goal or purpose behind a representational practice within a 
social milieu. In the language of concepts, this understanding is common. Friedrich Steinle argues that ‘[o]ne of 
the fundamental characteristics of concepts is their directedness towards a specific goal’ (2012, p. 105); Ingo 
Brigandt (2010), claims that concepts have ‘epistemic goals’ that figure in explanations and inferences in 
scientific theorizing; P.F. Strawson (1963) talks about the ‘purpose’ of a concept, which is echoed by Frank 
Jackson (2011); and Manuel Vargas (2013) suggests that concepts do particular ‘work.’16 Moreover, Sally 
Haslanger takes a similar line in her understanding of what constitutes conceptual engineering: 
 
The task is not simply to explicate the normal concept of X; nor is it to discover what things we normally 
take to fall under the concept we have in common; instead we ask what purpose is served in having the 
concept X, whether this purpose is well-conceived and what concept (or concepts) would serve our well 
conceived purposes(s)... (1999, p. 352).  
 
Taking stock, Michael Prinzing argues that philosophical theorizing about concepts has a common theme: 
 
All of these philosophers seem to have converged... on the same thought. The driving idea is that there are 
‘intentions’ or ‘goals’ behind concepts; they have ‘jobs’; they are supposed to do certain ‘work’; they have a 
‘point’, ‘purpose’, ‘role’, or ‘function’ (2017, p. 14).  
 
On this way of thinking, a representational practice is engineered when there are changes to our use of a term or 
concept, but the goal or purpose behind such usage is preserved (Haslanger 2020).17 This guarantees topic 
continuity. Moreover, understanding conceptual engineering in this way makes topic continuity less of an issue 
since it is less demanding than, say, extension preservation. We can change representational practices that 
result in extensional changes without disrupting the goal or purpose behind such practices. For example, if the 
                                                
15 Cf. Haslanger on epistemic amelioration (2020, p. 242).  
16 Other examples include: Haslanger (2000), Thomasson (2020), Nado (2019).  
17 In some cases, we might simply want to trash a representational practice in virtue of having a bad goal or purpose.  
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function of linguistic practices involving ‘marriage’ is, in part, to organize a nuclear family in line with particular 
roles, we can maintain this function, and therefore preserve topic continuity, even with revised practices with 
the term that includes application to same-sex couples.  
 
2.3.2. Etiological Functions  
 
Another way to think about function is to consider the etiological or proper function of a representational 
practice. Such functions are those that exist in virtue of being beneficial to our ancestors. For instance, the 
function of a heart, which is the reason why it exists today, is explained by the fact that it pumped blood in our 
ancestors, contributing to their survival. Etiological functions are those that exist as a result of natural selection 
over generations.  
 
This kind of view, offered as one type of conceptual engineering, is endorsed by Mona Simion and Simon Kelp 
(2020). Concepts, at least some of them, continue to exist and operate in our social and representational milieu 
in virtue of being beneficial to our ancestors; they are selected-for given environmental pressures. Such 
concepts have a successful history of positive feedback in a thinking and speaking community. Thus, according 
to Simion and Kelp, one way of implementing an ameliorative strategy, which is under our control, involves 
designing an enticing practice that people will be disposed to copy. A concept is successfully engineered when 
its designed function becomes a function that explains its continued existence (2020, p. 12). 
 
2.3.3. Why Not Both?  
 
Given the foregoing, how should we construe The Functional Account? It’s important to note that these 
accounts of function aren’t inconsistent. Sometimes we might be interested in changing a representational 
practice while preserving its goal or purpose (or trashing a practice if it has a bad goal or purpose). Other times, 
we might be interested in designing a function for a practice such that, through selective pressures, it becomes a 
proper or etiological function. For instance, we might want a designed linguistic practice for ‘marriage’ to be 
selected-for, and at the same time want linguistic practices with ‘food’ to change while preserving its extant goal 
or purpose (e.g. structuring our eating practices without harming animals). Thus, I will treat The Functional 
Account of conceptual engineering as inclusive of these two understandings. 
 
An important note is that on the inclusive account of function that I am working with, there is no connection to 
meaning or concept identity (Nado 2019, cf. Fisher 2015, Prinzing 2018). It is the continuation of a function 
that must be preserved post-engineering, rather than semantic continuity. The upshot is that conceptual 
engineering projects can be much more ambitious (Nado 2019). 
 
3. The Relative Merits 
 
I’m up to the point where I can assess the extent to which each of the approaches to conceptual engineering is 
able to promote social justice in accordance with (i) – (iv) listed in §1. I’ll begin with The Worldly Account.  
 
3.1. Promoting Social Justice: The Worldly Account  
 
When it comes to control, Cappelen is the first to admit that his account isn’t promising. Successfully 
implementing an ameliorative strategy is likely impossible. After all, a great deal of what fixes reference, the 
target of engineering on Cappelen’s account, occurs outside of the head. Because of this, our ability to know 
the reference of our terms is undermined. Therefore, so is our ability to control reference. In other words, 
according to Cappelen, ‘[t]he process governing particular changes [in reference] is typically incomprehensible 
and inscrutable’ (2018, p. 53). He recognizes that epistemic agents within a community are not fully, or 
perhaps not even mostly, informed of the relevant empirical facts that determine reference.  To compound this 
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problem, we might think that power-structures obscure the channels through which we could gain such 
knowledge. For example, we might be mistaken about who counts as an ‘expert’ in virtue of the fact that people 
occupy social positions that signal epistemic competence and trustworthiness, when in fact they are neither 
competent nor trustworthy (Fricker 1999). Thus, any attempt to actively bring about referential changes to our 
words is bound to be highly unreliable.18 
 
Perhaps a benefit of Cappelen’s account, however, is that it focuses on changing reference, which allows for the 
possibility of looping effects. Through changes to our thinking and speaking practices, we can affect which 
social categories exist in the world. This accommodates social justice projects that aim at amending or creating 
social kinds for the purposes of correcting unjust social relations (e.g., trans* inclusive feminism, marriage 
equality, etc.). However, without a means of deliberately bringing about changes to object-level facts, it is 
unclear whether this is much of a benefit to The Worldly Account. 
 
What about the right kind of reasons? It doesn’t seem that Cappelen’s account requires any kind of motivation 
to adopt a conceptual engineering proposal. This might make the chances of change much more likely. After all, 
control over thinking and speaking practices, and therefore object-level facts, is hard enough without requiring 
that people take up a practice for specific reasons. However, if we think, like Joey Pollock (2020), that some 
reasons are constitutive of certain ameliorative projects, such as the reasons that ought to govern linguistic 
practices with ‘marriage,’ then this is yet another stumbling block for Cappelen’s account. It seems that it will 
be too hard to bring a population to adopt a conceptual engineering proposal for reasons that motivated the 
engineer.  
 
Cappelen is also aware that in virtue of lacking control over semantic facts, conceptual engineering, if attempted 
to be put into action, runs the risk of harmful consequences:  
 
The fact that conceptual engineering is inscrutable and out of our control means that it is also possible 
(sometimes I think even likely) that those who try to achieve good ends through conceptual engineering will 
end up causing harms they didn’t intend. We have no prima facie reason to think the process is typically one 
that leads to amelioration rather than degeneration (2018, p. 159).  
 
Degeneration is clearly an issue. We want to make sure that our ameliorative projects are precisely that – 
ameliorative. And we can think of the problem more broadly. Attempts to put into effect a conceptual 
engineering proposal may not result in the improvement of our language, thought, or social facts. It might turn 
out that intended changes to our representational practices produce harmful consequences. For example, in 
trying to revise our use of ‘food’ so that it does not involve application to non-human animals, we might produce 
the unintended effect of pushing farmers into poverty as a result of losing their means of living; and perhaps this 
is something we want, or ought, to avoid.  
 
Of course, we should expect that bad things might happen when we try to implement an ameliorative strategy. 
However, this expectation must be weighed against our chances of success. On Cappelen’s account, we have no 
idea what the chances of success are, and thus all we are left with is the risk of degeneration.  
 
                                                
18 Laura and Francois Schroeter (2020) disagree with this. They argue that while we might not know all of the relevant 
facts that determine reference, this does not mean we are completely in the dark. And Steffen Koch says control is possible, 
but we need to recognize that it is a group-level project: 
 
‘...even though reference change on causal theories of reference turns out to require a collective long-term effort, it is 
nevertheless something that we, as a linguistic community, can bring about willingly’ (2021, p. 347) 
 
Even with this in mind, it remains an open question as to whether we have enough knowledge or understanding of the 
determinants of reference for this approach to be suitable for the deliberate promotion or advancement of social justice.   
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3.2. Promoting Social Justice: The Alignment Account 
 
It seems that The Worldly Account is not suited to promoting social justice. What about The Alignment 
Account?  
 
It's hard to know how much better Sawyer's approach to conceptual engineering is regarding control. In one 
sense, it is better than Cappelen's insofar as the goal is not to change object-level facts. This is one less required 
step. Instead, conceptual engineering is a matter of alignment: the extension of a term must come to align with 
the relevant subject matter fixed by a concept that the term expresses. However, it is unclear how much control 
we have in this process of alignment – especially when it comes to social kinds.  
 
Like Cappelen, Sawyer’s preferred account of metasemantics makes it hard to know the reference of our terms. 
As such, it faces similar problems. It may be too much for us to fully grasp all of the linguistic activity that plays a 
role in determining meaning, such as past patterns of usage, or who the relevant experts are, and this 
undermines our ability to control semantic facts.19 However, there is a plausibly deeper issue with Sawyer’s 
account.  
 
Sawyer accommodates the possibility of communal error in understanding aspects of the world. Of course, this 
does not entail the impossibility of communal knowledge and discovery. We need only think of our better 
understanding of natural kinds (e.g. gold) to see how communal error can be corrected through empirical 
investigation. To put it differently, we can knowingly align the extension of a term with the extension of the 
concept it expresses.  
 
However, things get difficult when we start thinking about the social world. Often, it seems, we cannot (easily) 
determine when a communal error has been corrected with respect to our understanding of social facts. For 
example, how can we tell when the extension of ‘race’ aligns with the extension of the concept that the term 
expresses? We would need to investigate objective properties, such as the property of having a race. But, 
besides moving past biological essentialism, and despite a rich history of investigation spanning hundreds of 
years, we haven’t really gotten close to settling on what race is. Kwame Anthony Appiah expresses this concern 
plainly when he says, ‘there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask ‘race’ to do for us’ (1986, p. 35).  
 
So, in the absence of a means of determining when a communal error has been corrected, can we still engage in 
conceptual engineering on Sawyer’s account? It doesn’t seem so. After all, the name of the game is to correct 
communal error. This appears to rule out several justice-oriented conceptual engineering projects that are 
about social kinds, such as race, gender, misogyny, and the like. What we need, then, is a way of working out 
when we have discovered genuine facts about the social world before we engage in conceptual engineering qua 
alignment.20   
 
This is a problem of ‘control’ not simply in the sense that we are unable to reliably manufacture change to 
semantic facts. Instead, it is a problem insofar as sometimes we do not have control over semantic facts with the 
aim of aligning such facts with the extension of a concept. We are often unable to know when intended change to 
the extension of a term aligns with the extension of a concept that it expresses. 
 
                                                
19 The benefit of Sawyer’s account, however, is that even if we do manage to change a linguistic practice, in whatever 
direction, if the extension changes then this will not disrupt topic continuity. 
20 In saying this, sometimes we can know when communal error has been corrected with respect to social kinds, such as 
our better understanding of sexual harassment or gaslighting (although, both are still contested). So, to be clear, my claim is 
not that Sawyer’s account faces epistemic limitations for all justice-oriented conceptual engineering projects, but rather for 
many important ones.  
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Sawyer’s approach doesn’t allow for much control. What about the possibility of looping effects? Unfortunately 
not. Remember, for Sawyer, it is the world, connected to a term via a concept, that guarantees topic continuity. 
And in order to maintain the legitimacy of a conceptual engineering project, we must not change the topic. 
Thus, change to the realm of (social) facts runs the risk of changing the relevant subject matter that an 
engineering project is supposed to be about. However, it is the changing of social facts that some conceptual 
engineers aim at in their attempts to achieve social justice. 
 
For instance, suppose that a conceptual engineer is interested in changing social facts about what women are, 
or who counts as a woman. As such, she proposes an account that is trans* inclusive, aiming to revise linguistic 
practices such that an amended category of woman is ‘looped’ into existence. Apart from saying that it is 
‘intuitively false’ that conceptual engineering changes the nature of women (or any other properties), Sawyer 
argues that such proposals transgress the limits of conceptual engineering (2021, p. 10). After all, if there have 
been changes to object-level facts that connect a term to a subject matter, then the subject matter has changed – 
there is no single topic that persists through changes to the extension of a term. Thus, we have not preserved 
topic continuity. This is recognized by Sawyer, who says:  
 
If the process of conceptual engineering changes, for example, what belief is, and does so, as Cappelen says, 
by changing the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for an object to fall into the extension of the 
term ‘belief’, then the property of being a belief is not a stable objective property that exists independently 
of the conditions that we associate with the meaning of the term ‘belief’ (2021, p. 10).  
 
Thus, looping effects, which change object-level facts, are not possible on The Alignment Account. This goes 
against many conceptual engineering projects that aim at changing social, extralinguistic facts.  
 
Does Sawyer’s approach allow for the possibility of bringing a population to adopt a conceptual engineering 
proposal for the right kind of reasons? It seems unlikely. If achieving alignment between the reference of our 
concepts and terms is already a tall order, casting doubt on the plausibility of conceptual engineering, then 
factoring in the added constraint that members of a thinking and speaking community take up a proposal for 
reasons that motivated the engineer is only going to make conceptual engineering less plausible.21   
 
Finally, The Alignment Account makes it difficult to assess whether a conceptual engineering proposal will have 
harmful consequences. Of course, this is due to being ‘out of our control’ in the sense that we cannot reliably 
manufacture semantic change. But it also runs the risk of harmful consequences insofar as the relevant subject 
matter is not always epistemically available to members of a community. So there will always be some doubt as to 
whether an engineering project has been successful, which might mean we under- or over-shoot our target, or 
miss it altogether. To give a more situated analysis, if the power to ‘decide’ whether change has occurred, as a 
matter of who decides whether we have gotten at the relevant subject matter, is distributed unjustly across a 
community, then degeneration is a genuine concern.  
 
For example, let’s say that the reference of the concept WOMAN is trans* inclusive. Further, suppose that 
attempts to redefine the term ‘woman’ fall short of full trans* inclusion, and stop at those who have had sex-
reassignment surgery. This might be due to prominent voices in the community who advocate for this more 
narrow ameliorative gender project, or because the government, seen as an epistemic authority, has passed 
legislation about who counts as a woman. While the amelioration of a representational practice has occurred to 
                                                
21 Given that the goal of Sawyer’s approach is just for the extension of a term, determined by linguistic practices, to align 
with the relevant subject matter, it doesn’t seem to matter what motivates people to adopt a linguistic practice. Alignment 
can be achieved with people adopting a proposed linguistic practice for different reasons. For example, suppose that the 
relevant subject matter represented by the concept FOOD excludes meat. The meaning of ‘food’ can be changed to match this 
subject matter through the adoption of revised linguistic practices with ‘food’ for different reasons – e.g., health, moral, 
environmental, fashion, etc. The benefit is that accommodating different motivations behind the adoption of a linguistic 
practice makes change more plausible.  
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some extent, it does not go far enough. Our understanding of what women are fails to align with what in fact 
women are. And this produces harmful consequences to the extent that certain people are unjustly denied being 
seen as belonging to a category to which they in fact belong. Put differently, the problem is that if the goal of 
conceptual engineering is epistemic, as Sawyer’s approach suggests, our attempts to improve linguistic 
practices will come up against (unjust) power that obscures our channels to knowledge and discovery. And such 
power can render our attempts at amelioration harmful.22  
 
3.2. Promoting Social Justice: The Functional Account 
 
The Worldly Account and The Alignment Account appear to be inadequate approaches to conceptual 
engineering for promoting social justice. Can The Functional Account do any better?  
 
With the shift from meaning to function,23 having control over the processes of conceptual engineering 
becomes much more plausible. After all, the goal is not to change a representational practice in order to bring 
about meaning change or preserve concept identity. With respect to promoting social justice, conceptual 
engineering on The Functional Account is a matter of changing a representational practice with the aim of 
having an ameliorative impact on social facts. On the different ways of understanding what ‘function’ means, we 
might want to change a representational practice but preserve its underlying goal or purpose; or else we might 
want to introduce a new representational practice, motivated by certain reasons, that will be selected-for.  
 
Controlling changes to a representational practice is, in the first place, much easier on The Functional Account 
insofar as we are not nearly as epistemically limited. We do not need to know all of the linguistic activity that 
plays a role in determining meaning. In some cases, all we need to identify is the dominant representational 
practice in a context, and reveal the relevant goal or purpose of this practice via some process of rational 
interpretation of what we trying to achieve (e.g., Edward Craig-style (1990) conceptual ethnography). Sally 
Haslanger (2020) captures this in her example of our use of ‘family.’  
 
According to Haslanger, the function of our concept of family is to organize our lives together with respect to 
the 'coordination of domestic life, for example intimacy, sex, raising of children, economic partnerships, 
intergenerational transfers of traditions and property' (2020, p. 251). In Western contexts, the typical 
arrangement that stabilizes coordination in domestic life consists of a husband, a wife, and biological offspring. 
The issue with this, however, is that the function of family thought and talk is contingently caught up in hetero- 
and bio-normativity. But this does not exhaust all domestic arrangements that can constitute a family. For 
instance, there are same-sex couples, adopted children, single or unmarried parents, and extended families. 
Acceptance of such domestic arrangements has been a result of societal pressure in the form of activism and 
material change (2020, p. 251).  
 
                                                
22 There is a sense in which Sawyer’s approach to conceptual engineering does well with respect to degeneration 
compared to The Worldly Account. This is because it isn’t possible to change the extension of a concept through conceptual 
engineering, despite it being possible to change the extension of a corresponding term. On The Worldly Account, the goal 
is to change object-level facts. This brings with it the risk of producing a unique harm: inappropriately changing the 
membership conditions for a social kind. For example, through extensive changes to linguistic practices, and other social 
facts, it is possible for a society to change what sexual harassment is – say, making it more impoverished by narrowing its 
application to a smaller set of behavior. The downside of The Worldly Account is that, despite being more impoverished, 
sexual harassment is determined by the conditions we associate with the meaning of ‘sexual harassment.’ On The Alignment 
Account, this is impossible. Sexual harassment is determined independently from the conditions we associate with the 
meaning of ‘sexual harassment.’ Thus, it does not risk inappropriately changing the membership conditions for social kinds. 
Rather, we just risk misunderstanding what the membership conditions are.  
23 Some like Fisher (2015), and perhaps even Prinzing (2018), tie function with meaning – the former offers a 
teleosemantics; the latter offers a view of concept identity. I follow Nado (2020) in thinking that meaning and function, at 
least in our effort to preserve continuity, should be treated separately.   
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This example shows us that the function(s) of certain representational practices is epistemically available to us, 
and in virtue of this, such practices can be scrutinized and revised. It has been recognized, for some time now, 
that existing practices with ‘family’ have been unjustly exclusive of other forms of domestic arrangement that 
can preserve the goal or purpose of such language.  
 
Moreover, an issue with The Worldly Account and The Alignment Account is that there are often no clear-cut 
clues as to when conceptual engineering has been, more or less, achieved. Sometimes we do not know whether 
meaning has changed, or whether meaning has aligned with the relevant subject matter. But on The Functional 
Account, there are obvious signs. We need only ask: Have social facts changed? Have trans* and genderqueer 
parents been accepted qua parents? This we can see from the commonsense point of view, or more clearly at the 
level of sociological and social psychological inquiry. Thus, not only is it possible for an engineer to recognize a 
representational practice, but it is also possible for an engineer to make an informed judgment as to whether 
their project has been, at least somewhat, successful.  
 
So far, I have only spoken about control with respect to one notion of function. Is control possible when it 
comes to implementing etiological functions? Simion and Kelp (2020) argue that the answer is ‘yes.’ To 
reiterate, the mark of successful conceptual engineering, on this approach, is when a designed function of a 
representational practice becomes a function that explains the existence of that practice. The designed function 
must catch on and be stabilized within a community of thinkers and speakers. And, for Simion and Kelp, a 
conceptual engineer can achieve this by acting on the environment that will drive adaptive change. The 
environment needs to be tinkered with in order to drive demand for the designed function. Thus, given that we 
can change the environment in this way, then we have a non-trivial amount of control over the direction and 
character of our practices.  
 
How does The Functional Account do with respect to looping effects? It is evident in the foregoing example 
that looping effects are not only possible but available for us to understand and actively set in motion. After all, 
once upon a time it might have been inconceivable that our linguistic practices with ‘family’ might include 
application to same-sex couples. However, with revised classificatory practices, off the back of social 
movements, same-sex couples now fall comfortably, but not without resistance, within the extension of ‘family’ 
(in many countries). This example shows that the amendment of social kinds, through looping effects, is 
possible on The Functional Account. But what about the creation of social kinds? This is also possible. Suppose 
that the goal of gender thought and talk is to keep track of people’s self-identification, or the internal maps that 
they use to navigate social reality (e.g. Jenkins 2016). This goal has been preserved with the introduction of 
linguistic practices with ‘non-binary.’ And given how looping effects work, the classification of people as ‘non-
binary’ has brought into existence a new social kind: non-binary people. 
 
The Functional Account also does well with respect to accommodating the possibility of bringing a population 
to adopt a representational practice for the right kind of reasons. It's worth emphasizing that on the etiological 
function approach to conceptual engineering, it appears that the name-of-the-game is to get people to adopt a 
representational practice for the reasons that motivated the engineer.  
 
On the etiological approach to conceptual engineering, the goal is not merely to change a representational 
practice, but for the practice to be adopted for the reason it was designed. That is, in the language of concepts, 
when an ameliorative strategy is ‘launched on a competitive market of concepts’, the hope is that the designed 
concept will ‘be used to do what [it is] designed to do, and [it] will continue to be used in virtue of the fact that 
the way of thinking about the world [it] made available was beneficial to users’ (Simion and Kelp 2020, p. 6 my 
emphasis). Thus, representational change must be brought about and sustained in a particular way. One natural 
interpretation of this, at least when it comes to social justice concerns, is that a representational practice must 
be adopted for the right kind of reasons. Joey Pollock (2020) argues for this way of thinking when it comes to 
concepts for social equality, such as MARRIAGE:   
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...in ameliorative projects of the sort under consideration, engineers are motivated by the pursuit of moral 
goods – they are interested in contributing to the dismantling of oppressive social structures, institutions 
and systems of belief, and replacing them with those that will promote and sustain social equality. When, in 
implementing an ameliorated concept, engineers seek to transmit their own motivating reasons to the 
individuals who adopt the new concept, it is because acceptance of these reasons is partly constitutive of the 
sorts of changes that they wish to effect – individuals who adopt the new concept ought (if the project is 
considered to be successful) to be appropriately motivated by specific moral considerations (2020, p. 88). 
 
Pollock believes that an ameliorative strategy is often not solely about the adoption of a concept, but includes, as 
a matter of constitution, a certain set of motivating reasons. 
 
One might think: Requiring that people adopt a conceptual engineering proposal for the right kind of reason is 
simply implausible. It would be wonderful if, say, everyone revised application practices with ‘food’ because 
they were motivated by a moral concern for non-human animals. But it seems that we should be happy with 
different motivations so long as pernicious representational practices, and thus oppressive social facts, change. 
Given that the world is unjust, in which many people are suffering as a result of being situated in systems of 
dominance and subordination, adopting a revised practice for the wrong reasons may be good enough. It will go 
a long way toward resolving oppressive social relations, even if it doesn’t go all the way – at least, not 
immediately. 
 
I accept that this might be true most of the time. However, my goal in this section is only to examine whether The 
Functional Account can accommodate the possibility that, for at least some ameliorative projects, people adopt 
a representational practice for the right kind of reasons.  
 
As discussed above, Simion and Kelp (2020) show how control is possible on their functional approach to 
conceptual engineering. What is interesting to note is that control, on their way of thinking, just is getting 
people to take up an ameliorative proposal for reasons that motivated the engineer. Thus, given that control is 
possible, by acting on the environment that will drive adaptive change, it is therefore possible to get people to 
adopt a representational practice for the right kind of reasons.  
 
Can the approach that understands the notion of function as the goal or purpose behind a representational 
practice accommodate the possibility of bringing a population to adopt the right kind of reasons? 
 
It seems that if we combine the requirement that the goal or purpose of a representational practice must be 
preserved post-engineering and the requirement that people take up a representational practice for the right 
kind of reasons (at least for some conceptual engineering projects), then we are not too far away from the 
etiological functional account of conceptual engineering. Of course, there are differences – for example, how 
topic continuity is preserved. But when it comes to the possibility of bringing a population to adopt a 
representational practice, it seems that we simply have to manipulate the environment in a way that will drive 
people to adopt the practice for reasons that motivated the engineer (while preserving its goal or purpose, of 
course).  
 
For instance, suppose the goal or purpose of practices with ‘food’ is to organize a community around a set of 
eating resources. And, suppose that an engineer, motivated by moral reasons, wants to revise practices with 
‘food’ such that it no longer applies to non-human animals and that people adopt such practices for the same 
moral reasons. It seems that the conceptual engineer can achieve24 this by making changes to the social and 
material environment in which the practice will take place. For example, the engineer might create and engage 
                                                
24 Not by themselves, of course, but as a member of a community of activists.  
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in widespread, high-profile endorsement of certain documentaries (e.g. Dominion, Cowspiracy, etc.) that 
target individuals at the level of moral affect, such as triggering feelings of empathy, in the hope that those who 
watch such documentaries will suggest it to others.  
 
So, if we already accept that bringing a population to adopt a representational practice is possible on the 
etiological functional approach to conceptual engineering, then it must also be possible on the approach that 
understands the notion of function as the goal or purpose behind a practice. Both approaches need only accept 
that control and the adoption of the right kind of reasons is a matter of being able to manipulate the 
environment in which thinkers and speakers are embedded. This is something we can do.  
 
What about the risk of harmful consequences? On The Functional Account, degeneration is a genuine concern. 
Given that control is possible, then the environment can be manipulated by bad eggs in a way that produces 
harm in a community. And this is something that we have already seen: just think of figures such as Donald 
Trump and practices with ‘fake news’ to undermine credible news sources. It seems reasonable to think that the 
effect of this usage by such a high-profile figure is that a vast number of the U.S. population have come to trust, 
or trust more, news sources that are in fact untrustworthy – news sources that promote pernicious ideas about 
members of marginalized groups, thus cultivating or solidifying discriminatory, bigoted, and even violent 
attitudes and behavior.  
 
Despite this, The Functional Account does not suffer the same problem of degeneration as The Worldly 
Account and The Alignment Account. For the latter accounts, the problem of degeneration is a matter of 
shooting in the dark, as it were. Since we do not know when meaning change occurs, we do not know when 
meaning change will produce harmful effects. We cannot predict the effects of our attempt at revision, and thus 
we risk degeneration in a serious sense: we have no reliable means of foreseeing what will happen when we 
promote a particular representational practice. On The Functional Account, we do not need to know when 
meaning has changed. So, we can avoid this problem of prediction. This is not to say that we can be certain of 
the effects of promoting a particular practice. Instead, it is to say that we can make more reliable judgments 
about what will happen in a community if an ameliorative strategy were to be adopted. After all, the only thing 
one needs to judge is whether the purpose or goal behind a representational practice will be preserved, or 
whether it will be selected-for, and whether one’s aim for bringing about such change will be achieved. And this 
can be empirically discerned (e.g. from the point of view of commonsense or sociological inquiry).25 Thus, on 
The Functional Account, we can think more critically about whether to promote a representational practice 
given that we have, more or less, the ability to reliably judge whether that practice will have positive or negative 
effects for a community. This is clearly something important for social justice theorizing: we want to be able to 
make assessments about what will make things better, not worse.   
 
One final note about degeneration. Even though The Functional Account allows for the possibility of bad eggs 
having control over our representational practices, the visibility of our changing practices means that we can 
scrutinize people for pushing the practice in one way rather than another. Of course, we can scrutinize people 
for attempting to change meaning. However, we cannot judge them for having a substantive effect on meaning 
change since we do not know how much their contributions count. On The Functional Account, we can judge 
people, like Donald Trump, for having a substantive impact on our representational practices because we can 
see it first hand – we can see its widespread usage in our everyday lives. Thus, The Functional Account offers 
another benefit: we are able to make moral, social, and political evaluative and normative assessments about 
someone's thinking and speaking behavior. We can tell people that their promotion of a conceptual 
engineering proposal is right or wrong because of its effect on representational practices.26 
                                                
25 We can even update implementation strategies if our attempts at bringing about representational change are 
unsuccessful.  
26 This is clear in the case of high-profile figures, such as Donald Trump. But it is perhaps unclear how much we can 
judge lay people for their promotion of a representational practice.  
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4. Taking Stock 
 
So, what would conceptual engineering have to be in order to promote social justice? The foregoing reasons 
lean clearly in favor of The Functional Account. Neither The Worldly Account nor The Alignment Account 
seem to do well with respect to control, looping effects, and the risk of harm – though, The Alignment Account 
does better than The World Account. In contrast, The Functional account does relatively well with respect to all 
of (i) – (iv), however when it comes to the right kind of reasons, it might turn out that functions are simply too 
hard to manufacture, at least for morally motivated representational practices.  
 
I want to emphasize again that this assessment of the relative merits of each approach to conceptual engineering 
does not settle the dispute as to which is correct. If it turns out that there is no way of plausibly defending the 
idea of the function of a representational practice, then of course The Functional Account should be 
abandoned.27 All I have established is that The Functional Account gets closest to what conceptual engineering 
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